Demand

Americans stopped moving. I think most of them still want to.

Fewer people changed address in 2023 than in 1948, on 2.3x the population. That demand did not disappear. It got deferred, and it is sitting there.

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August 5, 2026/By Armand Aghadjanians, Director of Acquisitions

25.6M

Moved in 2023, the fewest since the Census series began in 1948

28.7M

Moved in 1948, on 142M people not 327M

46.5M

Peak year 1985, 1.8x today

7.8%

Share who moved, was 17.9% as recently as 1990

Fewer people changed address in 2023 than in 1948, on 2.3x the population. That demand did not disappear. It got deferred, and it is sitting there.

If rates break, it comes back. Storage feels it roughly a year later: rates peaked in 2023 Q4 and REIT revenue bottomed in 2024 Q4.

The problem

Chart

Both the rate and the raw count are at record lows

Share of people who changed address in the past year, and the same movers counted in millions.

Share who moved (%)
Movers (millions)
194819601970198519901995200020052010201520192023015304560

Both series happen to sit on similar numeric ranges, so they share one axis. The first is a percent, the second is millions of people.

Source: US Census Bureau, CPS Historical Table A-1

Two things are true and they pull against each other. Moving has drifted down since the mid-1980s for reasons that have nothing to do with rates: dual-earner households (two parties tied to jobs), an older population, harder zoning. That drift took the share from 16.1% in 2000 down to 9.8% in 2019, and it is not coming back.

But the last few years fell faster than the drift. That gap is what I am interested in.

It is the local move that died

5.9% to 4.2%

Local moves, share of people, 2019 to 2023

3.6% to 3.2%

Long-distance moves, barely budged

4/5

Share of the drop that came from local moves

People still moved for work. They stopped moving across town. Job moves are not optional. The move to a bigger place, or after a divorce, or once the kids are gone, is the one you can put off.

Moving is why people rent storage

Chart

Storage demand reasons, and how they changed from 2022 to 2024

Change in the share of renters citing each reason, in percent. Renters pick more than one reason.

-6%-3%0%3%6%9%Decluttering to sellAway from residenceClimate-controlled itemsInherited itemsRelative's items,life changeVacation home itemsNatural disasterCollege studentRemodelingLack of space at homeFamily grew (baby)Changing residence/ moving4.7%3.3%2.4%2.4%2.3%2.3%1.9%0.7%0.6%0.2%-0.7%-4.2%

Moving is the second largest reason overall at 30.5% of renters, behind lack of space at 46.2%.

Source: Self Storage Association consumer demand studies, 2022 and 2024 waves

Moving is the second biggest reason anyone rents a unit, behind running out of room at home. Of twelve reasons, moving fell the most by far, and it is one of only two that fell at all. Moving collapsed in the real world and the storage data shows it.

What I cannot prove: the study does not separate local moves from long-distance ones. So I can show moving drives storage. I cannot show a move across town beats a move across the country. I would like that number and I do not have it.

What is holding them back

Chart

Cheap mortgages are why nobody sells, and they are slowly going away

Share of outstanding US mortgages by interest rate, first quarter of each year.

Under 4%
6% and over
20132015201720192021202320250%20%40%60%80%

Shares of loan count.

Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency, National Mortgage Database

How many people are we talking about

6.7M

Deferred local movers, 2022 and 2023

2.7M

As households. Storage is rented by a household.

1.27M

Extra moving households a year if rates break

The rate shock started in 2022. Rates crossed 5% that April and 6% by September, and have been above 6% almost continuously since, dipping to a low of 5.98% in February 2026 and sitting at 6.66% in late July 2026. So the count starts in 2022. The Census only publishes through 2023, so I have two years to work with.

Roughly 2.7 million households wanted to move across town in 2022 and 2023 and did not. Rates stayed high through 2026, so the real number is bigger. I just cannot prove how much bigger until the Census catches up.

For what a rate break would release, I used a number somebody else measured. The New York Fed asked mortgage holders what they would do if they could keep their rate and move. Their odds of moving in the next three years went up 7.4 percentage points. There are 51.4 million outstanding mortgages, per the FHFA National Mortgage Database as of 2026 Q1. That is 3.8 million extra moves over three years, or about 1.27 million households a year.

Running my own deferred figure the other way gets 0.89 million a year. Two methods, different data, same neighborhood.

So what does that do to demand

The question I actually care about. If everyone who is stuck gets unstuck, does storage demand go up 5%? The arithmetic, in three steps.

Step one: how much do moves go up. 2023 had 25.6M movers, 13.8M of them local. Put the mover rate back on its pre-2022 trend and you get 2.0M more moves a year. That is total moves up 7.9%. Local moves alone go up 24.3%, because that is where the whole hole is.

Step two: the backlog on top. Rates have been high since 2022 and the Census stops at 2023, so I carry the gap forward at the same annual rate. By the end of 2026 the accrued stock is about 12.9M people who wanted to move and did not. If a third of that clears each year for three years, that is another 16.7% a year on top of the flow. Peak year: total moves up 24.6%.

Step three: convert moves into units. The SSA study says 30.5% of renters cite changing residence. Renters pick more than one reason and the twelve reasons sum to 181%, so a mover is not a whole unit of demand. Normalizing gives moving a 17% weight. I ran it both ways and show the spread rather than pick one.

Chart

What a rate break is worth, in percent

Moves versus the storage demand they convert into. The storage figures are a range, shown at the midpoint.

0%5%10%15%20%25%Total moves, flowback to trendTotal moves, plusbacklog releaseStorage demand,flow onlyStorage demand,plus backlog7.9%24.6%1.9%5.8%

Storage demand ranges are 1.3% to 2.4% for the flow and 4.1% to 7.5% with the backlog, depending on how much of a mover's demand you attribute to the move.

Source: Author's calculation from Census CPS Table A-1 and Self Storage Association 2024 reason shares

1.3 to 2.4%

Base case demand gain. The flow alone, every year.

4.1 to 7.5%

If the backlog releases. Peak year only, then it fades.

2.7%

Headroom at the REITs. Occupancy is 91.5% there; elsewhere it is lower.

What history says happens when the constraint breaks

Chart

Every time the constraint broke, transactions jumped

Rise in the annual transaction rate from the bottom, after the constraint lifted.

0%35%70%105%140%175%Housing 1981 to 1984Housing Aprto Oct 2020Housing 1990 to 1994Cars 2022 to 2025170%79%43%17%

Housing figures are starts, except 2020 which is new home sales.

Source: FRED series HOUST, HSN1F, TOTALSA

1981. Rates hit 18.45%, then fell. Housing starts went from 837,000 to 2,260,000 in 27 months, or 2.7x. Existing home sales jumped 36.6% in 1983 alone.

Here is the part that surprised me. Rates never got low. 1983 averaged 13.24%. What broke the logjam was the size of the drop, not where it landed. That cuts against my own sub-5.5% framing, so I am saying it out loud.

1990. Same size rate drop, a quarter of the response. Starts rose 43% over three years instead of 170% over two. The difference was credit: banks were repairing themselves after the savings and loan mess and plenty of people who wanted to move could not get a loan. Cheap money is necessary. It is not sufficient.

2020. New home sales went from 576,000 in April to 1,031,000 by October. It did not just recover, it finished 46% above where it started. Different kind of constraint though. That one was a door being locked and then unlocked, not a price.

The thing that repeats is the snapback. Every time the constraint broke, transactions per year jumped hard.

I used to say I was betting on the flow and not the backlog. That is a cleaner split than the data supports. When 1983 printed +170%, nobody could tell you which of those starts were people who would have built anyway and which were people who had been waiting since 1980. It is one number and it contains both. What the snapback tells me is that the combined figure jumps. Splitting it into flow and backlog is a story I would be putting on top of it.

What I will say is that the jump does not last. It runs a few years and settles at a level below the peak, which is what you would expect if part of it was a one-time release.

Why I might be wrong

Cars: the shortage ended three years ago and sales still have not recovered

Sales fell from 17.49M in 2019 to 14.23M in 2022. By 2025 they had climbed back to 16.65M, still 4.8% short of 2019. About 11 million cars worth of demand never showed up.

The chips were never really the problem by the end. By the time you could buy a car, the car cost more and the loan cost more. Everyone who waited came back to a worse deal than the one they walked away from.

Chart

And here is the one that actually worries me: prices go up when rates come down

Change in the median US home sale price during each period when mortgage rates were falling.

1981 to 19841990 to 19942019 to 20210%5%10%15%20%16%7%20%

Rates went 16.6% to 13.9%, then 10.1% to 8.4%, then 3.9% to 3.0%. Median sale price is mix-sensitive, not a constant-quality index.

Source: FRED series MSPUS

Three for three. Every time money got cheaper, houses got more expensive. The savings went into the price, not into the buyer's pocket. Prices are already 28% above 2019.

So the bear case is simple. Rates drop, buyers come back, they bid against each other for the same thin inventory, prices rise, and the affordability never actually arrives. Nothing releases. Exactly what happened with cars.

I do not have a clean answer to that

The best I have is 1983: prices rose 16% and starts still went up 170%. Rising prices did not stop the volume, it just meant both went up together. Volume is what fills units.

But if price eats the whole rate cut the way it did with cars, this thesis does not work.

Where I land

The FHFA studied this lock-in and concluded the missed sales are "mostly lost, not just delayed." They prevented 1.72 million transactions between 2022 Q2 and 2024 Q2, and at the worst of it in 2023 Q4 they cut sales of homes carrying GSE-backed fixed-rate mortgages by 57%.

I am not arguing with the measurement. I am arguing about which number matters. They are counting the backlog. I am counting the annual rate. A missed 2022 sale is gone forever, fine. But moves per year going from 25 million to 30 million changes what my units look like whether or not anyone catches up on 2022.

The size of the move matters more than where it lands. 1983 went off at 13% rates. A slow grind from 6.6% to 5.4% probably does less than a sharp drop to 5.9%.

Three things would tell me I am wrong:

  • Prices eat the rate cut. The car outcome. Honestly, the price history says this is the base case, not the tail risk.
  • Rates hit 5.5% and moving still does not budge a year later.
  • Long-distance moves recover and local ones stay flat. That would mean the drop was structural and I read it wrong.

I will keep the charts updated either way. It is interesting to watch.

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